Deception and Cognitive Load: Expanding Our Horizon with a Working Memory Model by Siegfried L. Sporer
fpsyg-07-00420 April 5, 2016 Time: 13:58 # 1
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 07 April 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00420
Edited by:
Jeffrey John Walczyk,
Louisiana Tech University, USA
Reviewed by:
Chris NH Street,
University of Huddersfield, UK
Steven Allen McCornack,
The University of Alabama
at Birmingham, USA
*Correspondence:
Siegfried L. Sporer
sporer@psychol.uni-giessen.de
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognitive Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 09 October 2015
Accepted: 09 March 2016
Published: 07 April 2016
Citation:
Sporer SL (2016) Deception
and Cognitive Load: Expanding Our
Horizon with a Working Memory
Model. Front. Psychol. 7:420.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00420
Deception and Cognitive Load:
Expanding Our Horizon with a
Working Memory Model
Siegfried L. Sporer*
Department of Psychology and Sports Science, University of Giessen, Giessen, Germany
Recently, studies on deception and its detection have increased dramatically. Many of
these studies rely on the “cognitive load approach” as the sole explanatory principle
to understand deception. These studies have been exclusively on lies about negative
actions (usually lies of suspects of [mock] crimes). Instead, we need to re-focus more
generally on the cognitive processes involved in generating both lies and truths, not
just on manipulations of cognitive load. Using Baddeley’s (2000, 2007, 2012) working
memory model, which integrates verbal and visual processes in working memory
with retrieval from long-term memory and control of action, not only verbal content
cues but also nonverbal, paraverbal, and linguistic cues can be investigated within a
single framework. The proposed model considers long-term semantic, episodic and
autobiographical memory and their connections with working memory and action. It
also incorporates ironic processes of mental control (Wegner, 1994, 2009), the role of
scripts and schemata and retrieval cues and retrieval processes. Specific predictions of
the model are outlined and support from selective studies is presented. The model is
applicable to different types of reports, particularly about lies and truths about complex
events, and to different modes of production (oral, hand-written, typed). Predictions
regarding several moderator variables and methods to investigate them are proposed.
Keywords: deception detection, cognitive load, working memory model, schema theory, episodic memory
Since the beginning of the 21st century, studies on deception and its detection have increased
dramatically. Particularly in the last several years, several trends can be identified: (1) Turning
away from nonverbal cues to a focus on different types of verbal content cues; (2) relying on
the “cognitive load (CL) approach” as the sole explanatory principle to understand deception;
(3) devising interventions to increase differences in specific cues by manipulating CL; (4)
narrowing the scope of deception research by an exclusive focus on the denial of negative
actions. While acknowledging that refocusing research endeavors in this way has led to fascinating
new findings, I argue that by doing so, researchers may have thrown out the child with the
bathwater. Based on the calculation of effect sizes of some individual studies, I demonstrate
that we ought to expand our horizon again. First, I argue that researchers should focus on
the cognitive processes involved in generating both lies and truths, not just on manipulations
of cognitive load. Second, by using newer versions of Baddeley’s working memory model
(Baddeley, 2000, 2007, 2012), which integrates verbal and visual processes in working memory
with retrieval from long-term memory and control of action, not only verbal content cues but also
nonverbal, paraverbal, and linguistic cues can be investigated within a single framework. Within
this framework, individual differences in language ability and working memory capacity can
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also be taken into account as well as the other components
of the four-factor approach (Zuckerman et al., 1981), in
particular arousal, stress and emotion. Third, this suggested
framework additionally allows the consideration of the control
of behavior and speech in oral and written communication
as well as in face-to-face interactions, including the mode
of production of a message. Fourth, focusing on the role
of scripts and schemata in long-term semantic and episodic
memory not only helps us to arrive at a better understanding
of the construction of both lies and true accounts but
also allows specific predictions about the types of content
details typically found in lies and truths at various retention
intervals. Fifth, I argue that studying different types of lies,
not just those of (potential) suspects, makes clear that different
processes are likely to be involved when recalling or lying
about negative vs. positive events and actions, and about
more complex autobiographical events including traumatic
situations.
MANIPULATING COGNITIVE LOAD: A
WORKING MEMORY PERSPECTIVE
Several studies have manipulated cognitive load under the
assumption that this will increase differences between liars’ and
truth-tellers’ behaviors (e.g., by reminding the sender to look into
the eyes of the receiver). While cognitive load seems to have
been successfully manipulated, and increased differences between
liars and truth-tellers in a variety of behaviors have been found
(see Vrij et al., 2010), to my knowledge these studies have not
investigated the cognitive processes themselves that are induced
by these manipulations (for the complexities involved in tapping
these processes in the educational psychology/learning literature,
see Beckmann, 2010). Manipulating cognitive load successfully is
not the same as investigating the cognitive processes evoked by
these manipulations. A more theoretical analysis is necessary to
do so (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014).
A very simple manipulation to increase cognitive load is to
have participants report about an event in reverse chronological
order (Vrij et al., 2008). Note that this technique is also one of
the components of the cognitive interview technique, which was
included to enhance the number of details in recall of episodic
events (Fisher and Geiselmann, 1992), not to add cognitive
load. However in the context of the CL approach while lying is
generally considered cognitively more taxing than truth-telling
(e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1981), it is assumed that differences
in observable behavior between liars and truth-tellers will be
enlarged when participants tell an account in reverse order.
There is substantial evidence for this cognitive load
assumption from polygraph as well as neuropsychological
studies using rather simple (e.g., YES–NO) questions and
response latencies as primary dependent measures (for critical
reviews, see Verschuere et al., 2009; Gamer, 2011; Verschuere
and De Houwer, 2011; Walczyk et al., 2013). Recently, Walczyk
et al. (2014) have responded to some of these shortcomings by
proposing an integrative cognitive model of deception for serious
(high-stake) lies, which I return to below.
But what about other paraverbal and nonverbal cues, more
complex questions and answers, and more complex verbal
content cues as investigated with the Statement Validity Analysis
and Criteria-based Content Analysis (Steller and Koehnken,
1989) and the reality monitoring approach (Sporer, 1997; Masip
et al., 2005)?
For example, in Vrij et al.’s (2008) study, 16 different,
more complex measures were collected, but, unfortunately, data
were only reported for nine measures, for which (marginally)
significant effects for the expected Order by Veracity interaction
were observed. I have calculated the effect sizes with the
respective confidence intervals for the reported differences
between lies and truths (see Figure 1).
Overall, the reported effects in Experiment 1 for the lie-
truth differences in the reverse order condition are rather large
in the predicted direction (more auditory details, contextual
embeddings, and higher speech rates in true accounts, and
more speech hesitations, cognitive operations, speech errors and
eye blinks in lies. However, in line with the arousal approach
of the four-factor theory (Zuckerman et al., 1981; Sporer and
Schwandt, 2007) –but contrary to assumptions generally held
by the cognitive load approach– , there were more leg/foot and
non-significantly more hand/finger movements in lies than in
truthful accounts in the reverse order condition. Furthermore,
ratings by police officers in Experiment 2 indicated that liars
appeared to have to think harder and to look more nervous
than truth-tellers in the reverse order condition. It is clear that
present accounts of “cognitive load theory” cannot serve as a
single explanation for the reported findings. Rather, both the
arousal approach and the attempted control approach appear
necessary to account for the increase in nonverbal and paraverbal
behaviors which are perceived generally as signs of “nervousness”
(cf. Zuckerman et al., 1981; Sporer and Schwandt, 2006, 2007).
There is also some recent research which shows that at least some
nonverbal behaviors signaling nervousness may be indicative of
deception in naturalistic settings such as crossing the borders at
immigration (see Meservy et al., 2005).
Furthermore, in Vrij et al.’s (2008) control group, which
presumably reflects constructing a lie without the added
cognitive load, there was little support if any for the cognitive
load approach. Hand/finger as well as leg/foot movements
significantly increased, and there were fewer auditory details in
truths compared to lies, with no significant differences for the
remaining six dependent variables which were omitted from the
report.
However, in my view Vrij et al.’s (2008) findings could be
reconciled with newer versions of Baddeley’s working memory
model (in particular, Baddeley, 2000, 2007, 2012; see Figures 2
and 3). If we assume with Baddeley that the central executive in
his working memory model is not only important for retrieval
from long-term memory but also for the control of action
(including movements of the extremities like hands, fingers,
arms and legs), reducing cognitive resources by imposing dual
task demands should make it more difficult for the sender to
control signs of nervousness. These predictions would have to
be tested with more stringent cognitive load manipulations as
done in the dual task literature (e.g., responding to peripheral
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FIGURE 1 | Effect sizes gu [95% CIs] for nonverbal, paraverbal, and content cues to deception in the reverse order and control group of Vrij et al.’s
(2008) study. Positive values indicate an increase in truthful statements, negative values an increase in lies.
visual or auditory stimuli) besides the rather global reverse
order instructions. Such cues could be manipulated either more
mechanically (e.g., by random visual or auditory signals) or in
an ecologically more valid fashion by (randomly determined)
intermittent visual (e.g., shaking one’s head) or oral (e.g., a sigh)
feedback signaling suspiciousness by an interviewer.
Furthermore, individual differences in working memory span
should be considered to look for potential moderators in these
effects (e.g., Engle and Kane, 2004). Finally, I expect the date
of the experienced event to be reported upon as a potentially
powerful moderator (cf. Sporer and Sharman, 2006) that has not
been considered in recent laboratory studies where lying or telling
the truth is usually about an event experienced immediately
before. I expand on this aspect in the next section. Finally,
investigators using the reverse order instruction should be aware
that this may inadvertently introduce errors in reports (Dando
et al., 2011). Any new method designed to improve detection
of deception should always also be tested regarding negative
side effects on accuracy, that is, whether or not it inadvertently
increases errors of recall (see Sporer’s, 2008, integrative model of
eyewitness testimony).
SCHEMATA AS A BASIS FOR THE
CONSTRUCTION OF LIES AND TRUTHS
Both in the basic memory literature on prose recall, and more
pertinently in the eyewitness literature, it has been amply
documented that people do not recall episodes verbatim but
merely the “gist” (e.g., of a conversation). One of the reasons why
I find Baddeley’s working memory model particularly attractive
for the understanding of lies and truths is that it also incorporates
links between long-term (both semantic and episodic) memory
and the active working memory components (phonological loop,
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FIGURE 2 | Baddeley’s (2000) revised working memory model. Note the
interplay between episodic LTM and Episodic Buffer. The central executive is
also considered important for the control of actions (Baddeley, 2000, 2012).
Reprinted with kind permission from the author.
visuo-spatial sketchpad and episodic buffer). What knowledge
do liars draw upon in constructing their lies? Obviously, if one
has not had a personal experience of an event or a sequence of
action one has to draw upon general declarative and procedural
knowledge to construe this event (cf. Herrmann’s, 1982, model
of speech production). If people have not had related or similar
particular experiences they have stored in their episodic memory
and which they can substitute for the real event they are supposed
FIGURE 3 | Baddeley’s (2012) revised working memory model. Note the
direct paths from LTM, semantics and perception to action, in addition to the
interactive pass via working memory. Reprinted with kind permission from the
author.
to talk about they have to rely upon their semantic memory
to construe such an episode. How is this semantic memory
organized, and what retrieval strategies do people use in such a
case?
While there may be many answers to this question, associative
network models (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Smith, 1998) and
fuzzy trace theory (e.g., Reyna and Brainerd, 1995) seem
to be particularly relevant. Although these models are more
descriptive, they have proven useful in studying eyewitness
testimony (e.g., Tuckey and Brewer, 2003b; Kleider et al., 2008),
and certain predictions outlined below are in line with these
models.
One approach that has been quite popular in the (social)
cognition literature has described this knowledge in terms of
scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1977) or schemata (e.g., Brewer
and Nakamura, 1984; for reviews, see Fiske and Taylor, 1991;
Rojahn and Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor and McMillan, 1992).
This approach has been applied to the assessment of credibility
of statements by Köhnken (1990) and Sporer and Küpper
(1995).
It is assumed that a schema or an action script summarizes
the characteristic components of a sequence of actions such
as ordering food in a restaurant, or a bank robbery. What is
stored are not the individual components (e.g., reading the menu,
the waitress taking notes...) but only a “pointer” to the schema
(Graesser, 1981). Supposedly, this serves as a quick and economic
way to store and retrieve schema-consistent information. With
repeated exposure to script-like action sequences, schema-
consistent information becomes more generic, abstracting from
specific episodes. With increasing retention interval, schema-
irrelevant details of concrete episodes fade from memory and
are less likely recalled (Tuckey and Brewer, 2003a,b; see the
meta-analyses by Rojahn and Pettigrew, 1992, and Stangor and
McMillan, 1992).
On the other hand, schema-inconsistent information, that
is, deviations from the schema that may be unique to a
specific episode is more likely to draw attention at encoding
(and may also be rehearsed more frequently, e.g., when
talking to somebody about the incident; cf. the literature on
autobiographical memory on the role of rehearsal of significant
life events: e.g., Conway, 1990; Thompson et al., 1996), and
hence is postulated to create a stronger memory trace. According
to fuzzy trace theory, both schema-consistent and schema-
inconsistent information are stored as gist traces, while schema-
irrelevant information is stored at a verbatim level, which is
more likely to be subject to decay (Reyna and Brainerd, 1995;
Tuckey and Brewer, 2003b). For example, the gist or meaning of
a conversation will be likely correctly recalled whereas memory
for specific expressions as part of an utterance will not (for
reviews, see Davis and Friedman, 2007; Read and Connolly,
2007).
A direct implication for the construction of lies is that lies
will be composed of typical or schema-consistent information
generally available to the story-teller. To the extent that
true experiences are unique and distinctive, that is, contain
schema-inconsistent information, this information will be more
likely recalled, while schema-irrelevant information is less likely
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to be available over time (see also the von Restorff effect:
von Restorff, 1933). A related distinction between central and
peripheral details of an event has also proven useful in the
eyewitness memory literature (Ibabe and Sporer, 2004).
In support of these assumptions, invented accounts in real
world cases have been characterized by their “abstractness”
(Bender, 1987) or as “schematic” (Arntzen, 1993). Hence,
invented accounts are likely to lack the richness of details
characteristic of true stories (Undeutsch, 1967; Steller and
Koehnken, 1989; Arntzen, 1993; Sporer, 1997, 2004). Although
the lack of details cannot be coded directly in an account,
and hence cannot serve as a lie criterion, ratings of perceived
“abstractness” are possible and can be considered on a continuum
from abstractness to quantity/quality/richness of details. Using
Semin and Fiedler’s (1991) linguistic category model, we could
show that invented accounts of personally significant life events
were rated as much more abstract than those of self-experienced
events (d = 0.48; Sporer et al., 2003).
In contrast, schema-inconsistent or atypical information
should be particularly diagnostic for truth-based accounts.
Atypical information has to be stored separately and is likely
to be even better recalled than typical or schema-irrelevant
information (Graesser and Nakamura, 1982; Tuckey and Brewer,
2003a,b).
With respect to credibility criteria, truth-based accounts
have been characterized by superfluous and unusual details,
unexpected negative complications and so forth (Arntzen, 1993;
Steller and Koehnken, 1989; Sporer, 1997, 2004). However, with
increasing delay (retention interval) schema-irrelevant details
are also likely to be forgotten more readily (e.g., Tuckey and
Brewer, 2003a,b). Graesser and Nakamura (1982) postulate that
the benefit of atypical information will decay with increasing
retention interval. A direct corollary for the construction of
lies would be that with increasing temporal distance between
the (supposed) perception of an event and the recall attempt
differences between truth-based and fictitious accounts are
likely to fade (Köhnken, 1990). An exception may be true
memories containing highly salient, “unusual” details which may
be more frequently rehearsed (and retold) and hence better
remembered. By comparison, memories of lies that do not
contain these types of elements will be less likely rehearsed.
These contrary predictions ought to be examined in future
research.
To summarize, the schema theoretical approach presents an
interesting framework that may help us to understand some
aspects of the construction of complex lies. To the extent that
events are not self-experienced story-tellers need to rely upon
general semantic as well as schematic knowledge to present
sequences of events. The older the memory of an event, the more
difficult retrieval will be, perhaps levelling differences in content
cues between lies and truths that may still be visible with younger
memories (Sporer and Sharman, 2006). Also, retrieval of older
episodic memory traces may rely more on schemata and scripts,
thus furthermore reducing differences between lies and truths.
The working memory model advocated here should also be
applicable to a broad range of lies and truths. It should be tested
with different types of lies (not just denials of negative actions as
in staged crime paradigms, partial concealment and omissions)
but also lying about positive events (e.g., past accomplishments),
(false) alibis and (false) confessions, or alleged traumatic events
(of physical or sexual abuse, or torture by asylum seekers).
It is not clear whether this model will be applicable to lying
about intentions where a reverse order instruction did not lead to
an increase in detection accuracy but merely to a more lenient
response bias (Fenn et al., 2015). The model may also be less
applicable to less serious lies in everyday life (DePaulo et al., 1996)
where speakers may simply adjust their utterances “on the fly” (cf.
McCornack et al., 2014, IMT2). But even when speech utterances
are produced at high speed, editing out information not to be
revealed does involve both the phonological loop and the central
executive, which may lead to slips and slower response latencies
(cf. Gathercole and Baddeley, 1993, model of working memory
and speech production and the discussion of slips below).
MODE OF PRODUCTION
A very simple question that could be quite crucial not only
in detection of deception research but more generally in the
eyewitness literature is the mode of production in which a
sender communicates his or her message. While communication
researchers have realized for a long time that the medium with
which a message is conveyed (oral, hand-written, typed) may
affect cues to deception, this issue has been largely ignored in
recent studies. For example, one of the major differences between
studies analyzing content cues using CBCA and RM approaches
on the one hand and SCAN on the other hand is that the latter
rely on hand-written statements by communicators.
There is some (although somewhat equivocal) evidence
from basic experimental memory, eyewitness memory, and
neuropsychological studies that recall of text and/or episodic
memories may depend on the mode in which statements are
delivered (Horowitz and Newman, 1964; Moscovitch, 1994;
Rosenthal, 2002; Kellogg, 2007). Relatedly, research on self-
reported medical histories has shown that the information
provided may differ whether the information is provided in
a self-administered questionnaire or in an in-person interview
(Bergmann et al., 2004). In eyewitness research, Sauerland and
Sporer (2011) have recently shown that the superiority of oral
vs. written reports may only hold for central details (e.g.,
facial descriptions of perpetrators and central aspects of crime
descriptions) both with respect to quantity and accuracy but not
for peripheral details (e.g., clothing) where the effect may even be
reversed.
Presumably, writing places higher demands on working
memory than speaking because writing is slower, less practiced,
and entails the activation of graphemic representations for
spelling words (Kellogg, 2007).
When cognitive load is high, performance for effortful
retrieval from long-term memory is reduced (Moscovitch, 1994).
Consequently, memory retrieval should benefit from a reduction
in cognitive load. This assumption has recently found ample
support from studies by Vredeveldt et al. (2011) in which
interviewed eyewitnesses were asked to close their eyes at the
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time of retrieval. When engaged in a cognitively more demanding
task (written description) witnesses may thus choose to describe
primarily those details that require less effort (clothing) rather
than those that require more effort (face). If, however, cognitive
load is lower (spoken descriptions) witnesses may have more
working memory capacity available to describe those details that
require more effort. Applying these ideas to deception research,
it appears necessary to be more specific when formulating
research hypotheses, taking the distinction between central and
peripheral details as a moderator into account (for a general
discussion of central vs. peripheral details, see Ibabe and Sporer,
2004).
On the other hand, writing a report of an event by hand or
typing it without time pressure may allow the writer to take
their time to prepare an outline first, deliberate each sentence
and its possible consequences (for example, when filling out
an insurance claim form). Nonetheless, in an intriguing study
Luria and Rosenblum (2010) found differences between lies and
truths in hand-written reports (in Hebrew script). Lies showed
longer and more variable mean stroke lengths and longer and
more variable mean stroke heights than true accounts (albeit with
rather small effect sizes; see Figure 4). Of course, this study needs
to be replicated with Roman hand-writing in different Western
countries. In another study with a large number of accounts of
self-experienced vs. invented personally significant events written
down in hand-writing immediately or one week after being given
the instructions showed that significant differences in reality
monitoring criteria could be detected (Sporer and Küpper, 1995).
As more and more communication takes place via computers
or smart phones, future research should also consider this
medium for analyzing linguistic and content cues to deception
(cf. Hauch et al., 2015). From a cognitive load perspective, we
would expect more writing errors when typing a lie than when
composing a truthful message (a hypothesis not supported in
Hauch et al.’s, 2015, meta-analysis). On the other hand, based on
DePaulo’s self-presentational perspective (DePaulo et al., 2003),
liars might be more self-aware and deliberate than truth-tellers;
hence, they may edit their typing errors more carefully. More
FIGURE 4 | Effect sizes gu for means and standard deviations of
stroke length and width (data from Luria and Rosenblum, 2010).
direct evidence comes from a study by Derrick et al. (2012)
that showed liars were significantly more likely to edit their
words on the keyboard (e.g., in using the backspace and delete
button) than truth-tellers (d = –0.12 [–0.19; –0.05]). Whether
or not their edits were aimed at correcting explicit typing errors
or not, was not investigated and should be investigated more
closely in future studies. However, when typing a message (as
in online chats or emails), differences in typing skill may be
an important moderator variable resulting in various levels of
cognitive load.
SOCIAL, CONTEXTUAL, CULTURAL,
AND PERSONALITY FACTORS
Besides cognitive factors, social and contextual factors may also
affect the number and quality of responses (Rosenthal, 2002;
Bergmann et al., 2004). Specifically, interviewers in the spoken
conditions may have subtly (although instructed not to) signaled
to the participants to speak more about central details than
about peripheral ones. It is known that such influences occur
(Rosenthal, 2002) and that people are not aware of exerting
them (Greathouse and Kovera, 2009). This could be tested
by interviewing some participants in person (and videotaping
them) while other participants make their spoken statements
with the aid of a voice recorder, that is, with no interviewer
present. If the spoken advantage is primarily due to social factors,
their influence should be diminished in the voice recorder only
condition. As the process of videotaping itself may increase
cognitive load (participants are often quite apprehensive about
being videotaped; cf. the literature on objective self-awareness:
Wicklund, 1975), comparisons with hidden cameras may also be
necessary. Within this paradigm, the role of cognitive factors, on
the other hand, could be tested by manipulating cognitive load in
a dual task manner during spoken reports. Cross-cultural factors,
for example when answering questions in a foreign language
(with or without an interpreter) in interviews of terrorism
suspects or asylum seekers will also have to be taken into account
as “natural variations” in cognitive load as a function of language
ability (Evans et al., 2013).
Differences in verbal intelligence and linguistic abilities may
also moderate the ability of speech (or written) production and
thus indirectly affect the relationship between cognitive load and
lie production. There is evidence from autobiographical memory
research that the origins of events retrieved by bilinguals varied as
a function of the interview language (Marian and Neisser, 2000).
LIES AND TRUTHS ABOUT WRONGFUL
DEEDS VS. POSITIVE EVENTS AND
ACTIONS
Probably determined by funding bodies, recent research has
exclusively focused on lies by suspects (or witnesses) about
criminal behavior or intentions. Most of the events to be
reported on are also negative in emotional tone. However, an
encompassing theory of lie and truth production must not only
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focus on such negative actions and events but should also be
able to explain reports of positive events and actions (e.g., a
job applicant emphasizing his or her accomplishments in the
past at a particular task). In particular, theorizing about the role
of inhibition in presenting a lie has explicitly postulated that
the respondent has knowledge about his or her true actions
which need to be “suppressed”, thus requiring mental resources
(Walczyk et al., 2003, 2005; Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014; for
reviews, see Walczyk et al., 2013). Rather than focusing on
suspicious nonverbal signs, investigators ought to pay more
attention to what a person is saying, that is, the content of
a message (Sporer, 2004; Reinhard et al., 2011; Ormerod and
Dando, 2014).
COMPARING THE PRESENT MODEL
WITH OTHER MODELS
Recently, several models of lie production have been proposed
(Walczyk et al., 2005, 2013; Levine, 2014; Levine and McCornack,
2014; McCornack et al., 2014; Walczyk, 2014). These models vary
widely in scope and the type of deception phenomena they could
potentially explain.
In his truth default theory (TDT), Levine (2014) made
the important point that in most day to day interactions,
communicators will tell the truth, thus making it particularly
difficult to detect the few deceptive messages that ever occur
(or deceptive parts of a message), given their low base rates.1
For specific types of messages, in particular, lies about crimes
(usually in the form of false denials or false alibis) the base rate
may be higher when the expected consequences of truth-telling
are high (serious lies). Nonetheless, in line with McCornack’s
Information Manipulation Theory 2 (IMT2), it is probably safe
to assume that for most lies the easiest way to proceed, requiring
the least cognitive effort, is to stay as close as possible to
the actual truth. This may be done consciously by planning,
designing and rehearsing a deceptive message, which together
are often described as deception strategies (cf. Leins et al., 2013;
Masip and Herrero, 2013). In one of our studies on a complex,
personally significant life event (participants’ driving exam) a
large proportion of participants admitted in a postexperimental
questionnaire that they had used episodic memories from their
own driving lessons to construct their accounts, despite the clear
instruction to “freely invent” their story (Sporer and Walther,
2006). Even if participants did not intentionally choose specific
elements from driving lessons or scripts for a driving exam
1An implication of Levine’s TDT is that recipients will show a truth bias when
evaluating communicators’ messages. Street (2015) has recently challenged Levine’s
TDT assumption, arguing that the truth bias may not be a distorting “bias” but
rather an experience-based heuristic that is likely to work well in many everyday life
contexts. When context-general information suggests that in this type of context
people will likely tell the truth it may well be adaptive to assume that people will
tell the truth under these circumstances. To the extent that this is the case, detection
accuracy will be higher than previously assumed. However, in other contexts, base
rates of lying may be higher. Consequently, it would be adaptive to adopt a lie
bias under these circumstances. Because both TDT and Street’s (2015) model focus
more on the detection of deception than on lie production discussed here, I will
not expand on this point.
derived from conversations with others, the frequency of recent
driving experiences preparing for the exam would create many
recently activated associative links which would now be readily
available for incorporating them.
But such “content borrowing” may also happen
unconsciously, without any planning or strategic intention
(see also McCornack et al., 2014, IMT2). As Lampinen et al.
(2005) have shown with simple word list paradigms, people may
create vivid false memories that are difficult to discern from true
memories. While the basic experimental paradigms used in this
and similar studies are a far cry from the complexity of narrating
autobiographical life events, numerous studies demonstrating
false memories as a consequence of suggestive questioning
or other misleading postevent information make it clear that
complex memories may be constructed without a veridical basis
(e.g., Read, 1996; Loftus, 2005; Lindsay, 2008).
But content for a convincing story is not just borrowed. Any
story to be told, whether truthful or invented, must draw on long-
term memory. This way, the present model is not a mere working
memory model. Reconstructive memory processes are at work
both when people recreate a true experience from episodic and
semantic memory and when they try to create (“invent”) a story
of an event they have never experienced at all, or not in the way
presented.
Specific cues activated by the retrieval context or the questions
asked by the recipient or an interviewer serve to engage retrieval
processes which activate relevant elements from long-term
memory and make them available in working memory. In doing
so, schemata and scripts from similar or related experiences may
also be engaged to search in long-term memory to speed retrieval
processes and to fill gaps when certain details are not readily
available.
In working memory, focusing attention on the retrieved
contents allows to engage in control processes that determine
which information is to be transformed into verbal utterances.
Information is to be presented or withheld in line with Gricean
rules of conversation (quantity, quality, relation, manner; Grice,
1975; see also Fiedler, 1989a,b; McCornack et al., 2014). Note
that Gricean rules play a role both in truthful and deceptive
communication but different principles are violated to different
degrees in specific types of lies (see McCornack et al., 2014, for a
detailed discussion).
Differences Between the Models
My (Working-)Memory Model clearly goes beyond Walczyk
et al.’s (2003) ADCM and Walczyk et al.’s (2005) Tri-Con models
by focusing more on complex lies. Thus, it is closer to, with many
points of overlap, with Walczyk et al.’s (2009) ADCM-Revised
and his most recent Activation-Decision-Construction-Action
Theory (ATCAT; Walczyk et al., 2014). Walczyk et al. (2014) try
to overcome many of these shortcomings in their earlier models
by incorporating some of the propositions of McCornack et al.’s
(2014) IMT2 and Sporer and Schwandt’s (2006, 2007) earlier
working memory model.
Note, however, that McCornack’s IMT2 and Walczyk’s ATCAT
models really focus on different types of lies: While McCornack
focuses on relatively frequent, everyday lies that are likely
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to be created and edited “on the go” during the process of
speech production, Walczyk and myself have more serious
lies in mind. Thus, the McCornack and Walczyk two models
complement each other, like two ships passing each other in
the night. One of the major differences of my own and these
models is that my model is also supposed to be applicable
to lies about positive events not requiring any suppression
of the truth. Furthermore, my model is also supposed to
be applicable to lies produced not only vocally but also in
writing (hand-writing or typed). Furthermore, I assume that
strategic aspects of both truth-tellers and liars affect both verbal
content and nonverbal and paraverbal behaviors. Serious lies
are often planned, prepared and rehearsed, and both truth-
tellers and liars engage self-presentational strategies to appear
credible (what Köhnken, 1990, refers to secondary deception).
In contrast, in McCornack’s IMT2 the role of planning and
strategic behavior takes only a backseat. Finally, my model
is informed by working memory and retrieval processes in
recalling self-experienced events and how they are reported.
Thus, the focus is more on truth-telling than on the production
of lies.
Predictions and Empirical Support for
My Model
One of the predictions from the present (working-)memory
model that is in line with all these models is that liars will take
longer to respond when answering questions. This proposition
has primarily been investigated in polygraph type studies (see
DePaulo et al., 2003; National Research Council, 2003), and more
recently in studies on the Control Question Technique (CGT)
and the Concealed Information Test (CIT; formerly labeled
“Guilty Knowledge Test”; for critical reviews, see Verschuere
and De Houwer, 2011; Walczyk et al., 2013). Most of these
studies, however, rely on simple Yes-No questions, perhaps also
on simple, one or two word utterances, that do not reflect the type
of complex lies I am addressing in my model. These models also
implicitly assume that something negative (a mock crime) is to be
hidden, using some form of inhibition processes (Gombos, 2006).
I fully agree with Walczyk (2014) that a comprehensive
model of lie production ought to incorporate a theory of mind
concept as postulated long ago by researchers on children’s
deception (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; see the meta-analysis
by Wellman et al., 2001). The very definition of a lie as
intending to induce a belief (subjectively believed to be false)
in another person presumes the attribution of the recipient’s
mental state as well as the intention to change that belief.
Where I disagree, however, is the one-sided discussion on lie
production that prevails in practically all contemporary accounts.
When researchers investigate differences between lies and truths
these differences may come about (1) by lie-specific cognitive
(and social) mechanisms that most researchers have investigated.
However, these differences may also be a function of (2) the better
accessibility of episodic (and semantic) memory traces truth-
tellers can take advantage of. My own model focuses more on
verbal content characteristics that become apparent in free recall
and open ended questions which initiate the retrieval processes
in truth-tellers. Associative network models (Anderson, 1983;
Smith, 1998) provide the basis for my assumptions which are
supported both by basic memory research that encompasses
research on working memory processes with those involved in
episodic memory, semantic and autobiographical memory (see
Figures 2 and 3; Conway, 1990; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce,
2000; Baddeley, 2012; Baddeley et al., 2015). The frequency of
access to traces of experienced events as well as the number of
(self-generated) cues to one’s episodic, in particular significant
autobiographical, memories and the accompanying rehearsal
processes (cf. Conway, 1990; Sporer, 2004) strengthen these
traces and speed up their access.
As an example, in a quasi-experimental study by Sporer
and Walther (2006) participants first reported freely about a
driving exam they had either taken, or were about to take
in the near future; half of the participants were also asked
specific, open-ended follow up W-questions on Who, What,
When, and What else (Camparo et al., 2001). In a re-analysis
of Sporer and Walther’s audiotapes by Sporer and Petermann
(2011), response latencies were determined from voice-spectrum
analyses by calculating the times between the end of a question
and the beginning of the corresponding answers. Although the
sample size for these comparisons were small, results indicated
medium to large effect sizes for response latencies as a function
of truth status. Liars took substantially longer to answer three
of these four relatively open W-questions demonstrating than
truth-tellers (Figure 5).
Note that in this study there was no “truth to be suppressed”
as the event to be described was still in the future. Also, all
participants were given the opportunity to prepare their story
beforehand (which, on average, took 2.25 min, SD = 0.85). An
implication of this finding is that “unexpected questions” or
questions within the “strategic use of evidence” technique should
make these differences even larger but not because retrieval of
“false” memories is slowed down but more likely because retrieval
of elements based on self-experience will be speeded up.
FIGURE 5 | Effect sizes gu [95% CIs] for response latencies to
followup questions in the interview. Positive values indicate longer
response latencies in lies (data from Sporer and Petermann, 2011).
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Ironic Effects of Blocking of Unwanted
Thoughts and Lies of Omission
The fruitfulness of associative network models becomes also
evident when we consider lies of omission, that is, (intentionally
or unconsciously) leaving out information from an account
(see McCornack’s IMT2). According to the prevailing models
discussed above, particularly when the lie is about a wrong-
doing or an attitude opposite to the one held by the storyteller,
and/or when the interviewee is a guilty criminal suspect,
the storyteller must also suppress thoughts about the truth
(Gombos, 2006). This continued suppression of unwanted
thoughts may inadvertently preoccupy his or her thinking
(Pennebaker and Chew, 1985; see also Lane and Wegner, 1995,
model of secrecy).
While McCornack et al. (2014) postulate that this occurs
rather spontaneously during message production, Wegner’s
(1994) ironic processing theory suggests that the very process
of suppressing a thought actually strengthens it. Note that this
proposition is also in full agreement with my assumption that
the number and frequency of activated paths in an associated
network (Anderson, 1993; Smith, 1998) makes them more
accessible and ready for output.
Wegner (1994) assumes two types of processes: an intentional
operating process and an ironic monitoring process. Based on
early theorizing in cybernetics, goal-directed behavior results
from a cycle of “operate” and “test” mechanisms in a test-operate-
test-exit (TOTE) unit (Miller et al., 1960; see also Köhnken’s,
1990, application of these mechanisms to deception). According
to Wegner, the operating process “orients the person toward
items of sensation and memory that are consistent with the
desired state of mind” (p. 37). This process is effortful and
consumes resources and hence is subject to interferences from
other attentional demands. In contrast, the monitoring process
is not conscious, requires little mental effort and searches
continuously for sensations and thoughts that are consistent
with the achievement of mental control. The theory has received
empirical support with various paradigms, from stereotype
suppression, self-presentation, and deception.
Applied to deception, a communicator attempts to control his
or her thoughts and behaviors in order to appear credible. In
the background, the ironic monitoring continuously searches for
thoughts and behaviors that might counteract this intention. As
the operating process requires more effort than the monitoring
process, situational factors like time pressure and cognitive
demands but also dispositional factors like low working memory
capacity will impair the operating process more than the ironic
processes.
As the research following Wegner’s theory shows, repeatedly
thinking that we should or must not think certain thoughts, utter
them in speech, or show them in overt action actually increases
the frequency of these behaviors. Importantly for the present
discussion, these effects are stronger in dual task paradigms
where cognitive resources are depleted by concurrent tasks (e.g.,
when trying to hold a pendulum steady and simultaneously
counting backwards by threes from 1000; Wegner et al., 1998; see
also Wegner, 2009). In the domain of deception among partners,
survey data provided correlational evidence that past “hot
crushes” (desired romantic relationships that never materialized
and were most often thought about) preoccupied them more
and were more secret than relationships less often thought about
(Wegner et al., 1994). In an ingenious follow-up laboratory
experiment in which one team (a dyad of participant strangers)
was encouraged to touch their opposite sitting team partner
either secretly or with knowledge of the opposing team (another
dyad), preoccupation of thought and subsequent attractiveness
ratings were highest for the secret contact person compared to
the other conditions. Other studies have also applied Wegner’s
model to cognitive consequences of keeping secrets (e.g., Lane
and Wegner, 1995; Lane and Liersch, 2012; for a comprehensive
treatment of the relationship between keeping secrets and
speech production, see Spitznagel, 1998). Furthermore, Wardlow
Lane et al. (2006) linked this model to the theory of mind
concept, investigating in detail the failure of speakers’ control
over leaking private information during language production.
Wegner’s theory as well as the studies in support of it, indicate
that it is more difficult to intentionally omit or suppress
information the recipient should not know about. Although some
of the paradigms used are rather simple, I would like to see further
tests with more complex contents and with different types of
topics.
Compatible with Wegner’s model are also findings from
an ingenious research program by Bredenkamp and colleagues
who investigated slips of the tongue (including “Freudian”
slips, Freud, 1901/1954) and slips of action (see Baars, 1992)
in a series of experiments (for a summary, see Hamm and
Bredenkamp, 2004). The paradigms used were rather simple,
examining spoonerisms (transpositions of [usually initial] sounds
of two or more words) with word pairs and should not be
seen as conclusive demonstrations of “Freudian” slips (see Baars
et al., 1992). Nonetheless, the theoretical rationale by Hamm
and Bredenkamp (2004) combines Baddeley’s (2000) working
memory model with Gathercole and Baddeley’s (1993) model of
speech production. The elegance of Hamm and Bredenkamp’s
experiments lies in the fact that they involve direct independent
manipulations of the phonological loop and the central executive
that affect both the production of spoonerisms and response
latencies. Differences in response latencies also play a central
role in Walczyk and colleagues’ theorizing as well as in the
newer “memory detection” literature (Walczyk et al., 2009, 2013;
Verschuere and De Houwer, 2011).
CONCLUSION
My major concern with recent studies on cognitive load is that
despite the creativity of many of the interventions suggested
these are not derived from general theoretical principles.
Also, many of the dependent variables measured are study-
specific (e.g., sometimes general details, sometimes more specific
details regarding spatial arrangements, “inconsistencies”, or even
paraverbal or nonverbal behaviors and impressions). We need
a theory of cognitive load that specifies both the cognitive
processes induced by these manipulations as well as a taxonomy
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of outcomes (cues) likely to be affected by them. Also, the other
components of the four-factor model still need to be considered.
Furthermore, note that many of the theoretical arguments
I drew upon to suggest changes in paradigms were not
derived from theoretical analyses of the cognitive processes
involved in constructing lies but from basic and applied
memory research which is usually concerned with studying
“truthful” (but perhaps error-prone) recall from episodic and/or
autobiographical memories. While working memory may be
particularly taxed in constructing lies, we need to compare the
processes involved in generating both truthful and invented
accounts that involve the interplay of attention, working memory,
and long-term semantic and episodic memory as well as the
production of speech and action.
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